The Steering Board is composed of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U. S., the UK and the EU, with Türkiye representing the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. Russia is technically also a member but since July 2021 no longer participates in the meetings. At a political level, the Bosniak-Croat electoral dispute is fundamentally about who gets to control the Federation and the linked question of who determines the nation’s leadership. Unlike Bosniaks and Serbs, Croats form the majority in neither the Federation nor RS, making it more difficult for them to protect their interests at both the entity and national levels.
Biden's Team Is Dangerously Messing in Bosnia's Politics
Yet once the preliminary results become public a day or two after the vote, it will be clear which side has carried the day, and any intervention will look like trying to change the result after the fact.   Crisis Group telephone interviews, European and U. officials, August 2022.  Tweet by Reuf Bajrović, former Federation minister of energy, @ReufBajrovic, 2:51 pm, 16 August 2022.
Peace support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995
Most of Bosnia’s foreign partners want to see this irritant in Bosniak-Croat relations removed by then.  In 2005, the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission issued a damning report saying the high representative’s powers were “fundamentally incompatible with the democratic character of the state and the sovereignty of [Bosnia and Herzegovina]” and warning of “a strong risk of perverse effects: local politicians have no incentive to accept painful but necessary political compromises since they know that, if no agreement is reached, in the end the High Representative can impose the legislation”.
In effect, it would become harder for the Bosniak majority to form a government without Croat representatives but also harder for those Croats to block government decisions. Bosniak political leaders nonetheless reacted furiously to what they saw as an international betrayal. A former Federation minister warned that “there would be protests, but also public pressure the likes of which the [Office of the High Representative] has never felt, because this is the first time he is imposing a decision which is opposed by the majority of citizens”.  Bakir Izetbegović, head of the Bosniak-majority Party of Democratic Action, alluded to the risk of civil strife by saying “we’ve counted … how many hunters we have, how many young people and how many drone instructors”, earning swift condemnation from the U.
Much of the time, they catalysed Bosnian leaders to act on their own. On some occasions, however, high representatives acted themselves – to remove and appoint leaders, to amend both entities’ constitutions and to enact important laws, including one creating a state court. Bosnia’s Constitutional Court reinforced these changes.  One of these is the entity veto. Two thirds of either entity’s representatives can scuttle any legislation without recourse. Another is the vital national interest veto. A majority of any constituent people’s representatives can block a law, though the Constitutional Court can override the veto. Not surprisingly, [the] degree of foreign intrusion [into the peace process] proved divisive.
Bosnia and Herzegovina | BMZ
07 billion Bosnia-Herzegovina convertible marks (BAM), or roughly $548 million; the 2020 Federation budget (the most recent available) was 4. 95 billion BAM, or roughly $2. 5 billion.  Crisis Group telephone interview, senior international official, 15 August 2022.  Crisis Group interviews, current and former Bosnian and international officials, Sarajevo and Banja Luka, June-July 2022. Polls are particularly fraught because control of the Federation hinges on one or two swing seats in the entity’s upper legislative chamber.
Bosnia and Herzegovina | Facts, Geography, History, &
Not surprisingly, this degree of foreign intrusion proved divisive. In general, Sarajevo welcomed it and wanted it to continue, but Croats and Serbs tended to be at best ambivalent, at worst angry and hostile. Moreover, the vesting of so much power in an unelected outsider became increasingly controversial over time, and not just inside Bosnia.  RS officials showed they were willing to go to the brink to resist laws emplaced by the high representative, who ceased using his powers from mid-2011 until July 2021. The Peace Implementation Committee’s Steering Board, the body that appoints and advises the high representative, supported his decision to refrain.  This hiatus ended in July 2021, when outgoing High Representative Valentin Inzko imposed a law setting criminal penalties for, among other things, denying genocide established by Bosnian or international courts. This law was mainly about the 1995 Srebrenica massacre of 8, 000 Muslim men and boys by Bosnian Serb forces, which the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague repeatedly characterised as genocide.
embassy.  Demonstrations in front of the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo from 25 to 27 July may have attracted as many as 7, 000 people, though an international official disputed that figure and said party organisers may have bussed in some of the participants.  Schmidt appeared to back down, but the reforms are still on the cards. The High Representative imposed only the integrity package on 27 July.
Bosnia and Herzegovina's Hot Summer | Crisis Group
In response, in 1997, at a meeting held in Bonn, Germany, the Peace Implementation Council, a group of 55 states and agencies helping manage the peace process, endowed the high representative, the official responsible for seeing through the Dayton accord’s civil aspects, with broad governing authority (known as the Bonn powers).  Over the next several years, successive high representatives used these powers with increasing effect and transformed the country.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992–1995
The full package of measures is a slightly updated version of one that Bosniak and Croat leaders came close to agreeing on during the U. and EU-mediated talks that broke off in March. The full package of measures is a slightly updated version of one that Bosniak and Croat leaders came close to agreeing on during the U. and EU-mediated talks that broke off in March.  They are carefully balanced, giving each side some of what it wants. Croats would get more of a say in electing the delegates who represent them in the Federation’s House of Peoples. Bosniaks would get several tools to prevent the Federation government from succumbing to unilateral vetoes by any ethnic caucus, which Croat leaders have abused.
 These measures were not controversial because they affect all parties equally, simply making it harder to cheat.  But Schmidt has not abandoned the other two sets of reforms. Instead, he gave the Federation leadership – meaning the leaders of the parties represented in its parliament – about six weeks (roughly until early or mid-September, though later comments implied a flexible deadline) to come to agreement on some version of them, promising to act if they did not.  Technically, he could wait until the cantonal assemblies elected on 2 October take office, which normally happens about a month later.
Bosnia and Herzegovina travel advice - GOV.UK
Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended